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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

peals concluded that without intent to alter the surface water's natural
course, the common enemy rule did not apply.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina found two errors in the
court of appeals' ruling. First, the court of appeals erred in addressing
whether the common enemy rule applied. Appellate courts are restricted to determining issues raised and ruled upon by the trial court.
Neither party appealed the trial court's ruling that the common enemy
rule applied, so the court of appeals had no jurisdiction to consider
the issue. Second, the court of appeals erred in holding that the
common enemy rule merely extended the common law rule. The
court held that according to case law, the common enemy rule and the
common law rule were the same rule.
Additionally, the court ruled that a directed verdict on the issue of
nuisance was not appropriate. The test for nuisance, the court held,
was whether the nuisance had become "dangerous at all times and under all circumstances to life, health, or property." Because Lucas' land
flooded in every heavy rain and he was unable to grow crops on a portion of his land, ample evidence existed for a jury to decide whether
Rawl's actions amounted to a nuisance per se.
In dissent, Justice Pleicones stated the common enemy rule applies,
but that nuisance per se did not exist. To find nuisance, he argued,
evidence that the surface water accumulated, rather than merely ran
from higher land onto adjacent lower land, needed to be present. Justice Pleicones found Lucas' situation to lack such evidence and characterized the situation as damnum absque injuia-not caused by a wrongful act. Justice Pleicones also found that Rawl's clearing of his land for
farming did not amount to nuisance per se.
Because the court's majority concluded that the court of appeals
erred in determining that the common enemy rule did not apply and
the trial court was correct in refusing to issue a directed verdict on the
nuisance claim. The court upheld the jury award of damages for nuisance.
Kathtyn Garner
SOUTH DAKOTA
First Lady, LLC. v.JMF Props., LLC, 681 N.W.2d 94 (S.D. 2004) (holding both the civil use rule and the reasonable use rule for water drainage required a test of reasonableness).
Both First Lady Motel ("First Lady") and JMF Properties, L.L.C.
("Tramway") were located at the base of a 300-foot mountain in Keystone, South Dakota. Originally built in 1991, First Lady sat at the base
of the mountain. Tramway, originally built in 1965, was situated adjacent and above First Lady. In 1997, First Lady built a retaining wall
around its property leaving a steep embankment directly behind the
wall. First Lady also created a berm on Tramway's property by piling
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dirt and debris left from the construction of the retaining wall. Three
years later, Tramway began making improvements on its property. To
prevent excessive erosion and vegetation loss, Tramway made crosscuts, rolling dips, and hump swales across the road leading to its property. When heavy rains caused water and silt to run downhill and over
the retaining wall towards First Lady, First Lady filed suit against
Tramway claiming nuisance and requesting abatement of the nuisance.
The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit entered judgment for
First Lady and required Tramway to abate the nuisance. Tramway appealed to the South Dakota Supreme Court.
First Lady had to prove Tramway's acts constituted a nuisance. Furthermore, First Lady did not claim Tramway acted unlawfully. Instead,
First Lady needed to prove Tramway failed to perform a duty. In order
to determine whether Tramway failed to perform their legally required
duties, the court began with an analysis of South Dakota's drainage
law. Under South Dakota's civil law rule, property owners may drain
water from their properties to natural or established watercourses and
natural depressions. Under the reasonable use rule, a property owner
may alter surface water flow so long as the alteration is reasonable.
Although South Dakota codified the civil law rule with respect to water
drainage, most courts apply the reasonable use rule when dealing with
urban drainage of surface water. Because the trial court did not clearly
state which drainage rule it applied when requiring Tramway to abate
the nuisance, the court considered both the civil law rule and reasonable use rule.
The court previously stated that drainage under the civil law rule
was conditioned upon accomplishing natural drainage without unreasonably injuring neighboring properties. Therefore, under both the
civil law rule and under the reasonable use rule, Tramway could legally
drain its property subject so long as its actions were reasonable. Because reasonableness was a question of fact and the trial court did not
consider any findings of fact related to natural discharge or the reasonableness of Tramway's actions, the court reversed and remanded
the trial court's decision to reconsider the evidence in light of the reasonable test.
Aimee Wagstaff
TEXAS
Herrmann v. Lindsey, 136 S.W.3d 286 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding: (1)
the contract to sell land was illegal because it reserved to seller more
than one-half the irrigation pumping rights in violation of state law,
which required one-half the irrigation pumping rights remain with the
land; (2) where seller of land who owned irrigation pumping rights
entered into an illegal contract with purchaser of land, purchaser was
entitled to deed reformation; and (3) affirmative contract defenses did
not apply).

